A Secure Group Communication Architecture for Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle by Phillips, Adrian N. et al.
University of Dayton
eCommons
Computer Science Faculty Publications Department of Computer Science
1-2009
A Secure Group Communication Architecture for
Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Adrian N. Phillips
Air Force Institute of Technology
Barry Mullins
Air Force Institute of Technology
Richard Raines
Air Force Institute of Technology
Rusty O. Baldwin
University of Dayton, rbaldwin1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/cps_fac_pub
Part of the Graphics and Human Computer Interfaces Commons, and the Other Computer
Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Computer Science at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Computer Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Phillips, Adrian N.; Mullins, Barry; Raines, Richard; and Baldwin, Rusty O., "A Secure Group Communication Architecture for
Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicle" (2009). Computer Science Faculty Publications. 118.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/cps_fac_pub/118
SECURITYAND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Security Comm. Networks. 2009; 2:55–69
Published online 28 August 2008 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/sec.55
A secure group communication architecture for autonomous
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Summary
This paper investigates the application of a secure group communication architecture to a swarm of autonomous
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A multicast secure group communication architecture for the low earth orbit
(LEO) satellite environment is evaluated to determine if it can be effectively adapted to a swarm of UAVs and
provide secure, scalable, and efficient communications. The performance of the proposed security architecture is
evaluated with two other commonly used architectures using a discrete event computer simulation developed using
MATLAB. Performance is evaluated in terms of the scalability and efficiency of the group key distribution and
management scheme when the swarm size, swarm mobility, multicast group join and departure rates are varied.
The metrics include the total keys distributed over the simulation period, the average number of times an individual
UAV must rekey, the average bandwidth used to rekey the swarm, and the average percentage of battery consumed
by a UAV to rekey over the simulation period. The proposed security architecture can successfully be applied to a
swarm of autonomous UAVs using current technology. The proposed architecture is more efficient and scalable
than the other tested and commonly used architectures. Over all the tested configurations, the proposed architecture
distributes 55.2–94.8% fewer keys, rekeys 59.0–94.9% less often per UAV, uses 55.2–87.9% less bandwidth to
rekey, and reduces the battery consumption by 16.9–85.4%. Published in 2008 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEY WORDS: group key management; multicast; security; unmanned aerial vehicles
1. Introduction
A swarm of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) has great potential to provide benefits in a
variety of applications, especially in the Department
of Defense (DoD) intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance (ISR) mission. UAV swarm applications
include continuous border patrol, battlespace surveil-
lance, mapping routes for troop movement, real-time
information distribution to mobile military units, and
extending communications via an airborne network.
Grouping UAVs into a swarm allows them to carry a
range of sensors with an array of capabilities, creating
a diverse group that provides a wide viewing range
and increased reliability through redundancy [1].
A swarm of UAVs is an example of a mobile ad hoc
network (MANET). A MANET is a system of mobile
hosts connected by wireless links, the union of which
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forms a communication network modeled in the form
of an arbitrary communication graph [2]. The lack of
fixed infrastructure and the mobility of nodes in a
MANET cause frequent changes in the network to-
pology. This unpredictable environment presents nu-
merous challenges especially in providing efficient
communication. In addition, most nodes in a MANET
rely on batteries, which limit available power and
further compounds the challenge and increases the
need for an efficient communication method.
One effective way to achieve efficient communica-
tion in a MANET is through multicast communication.
Multicasting is a set of technologies that allows a
source node to send data to multiple destination nodes
simultaneously while transmitting only a single copy of
the data on to the network [3]. The data are replicated
for the destination nodes only when necessary. In a
cooperative environment, such as a UAV swarm, nodes
often need to transmit data to the entire group. Com-
munication via multicasting, as opposed to unicasting,
significantly reduces the processing load on the source
and the overall bandwidth used in the network. More-
over, in a wireless environment, due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium, multicasting has the
potential to further reduce network traffic, and hence
reduce network energy expenditure [4].
In addition to making communication efficient,
ensuring the security of the communication is another
increasingly important feature in a UAV swarm; this is
especially true in the military. Previous UAV swarm
research improved communication efficiency and ef-
fectiveness, with little emphasis on security [5–7].
However, the sensitivity of UAV swarm applications
necessitates a secure communication architecture that
provides DoD-mandated information assurance. With
this added security component, a swarm of autono-
mous UAVs can provide a unique and powerful net-
centric asset to support the warfighter.
2. Security in a Multicast Environment
2.1. Security Services
There are basic security services that should be built in
all security architectures regardless if the environment
is wired, wireless, unicast, multicast, infrastructure, or
ad hoc. These include confidentiality, availability, in-
tegrity, non-repudiation, and authentication. In addition
to these, there are security services that are unique to a
multicast environment including group key secrecy,
forward secrecy, and group access control (GAC).
Group key secrecy guarantees that it is computationally
infeasible for an adversary to discover any group key
[8]. Forward secrecy ensures newmembers are not able
to read past traffic, and backward secrecy ensures
former members are not able to read present and future
traffic [9]. GAC is the ability to permit or deny
membership into multicast groups [10].
2.2. Group Key Management
For secure wireless multicasting, cryptography and key
management schemes are needed, in which crypto-
graphic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages.
The group key management scheme accomplishes the
management and distribution of these keys. This in-
cludes enforcing the security services described above,
which ensure only legitimate members of the multicast
group hold valid keys and can access group data at any
time during a multicast session.
In a UAV swarm, most if not all of the UAVs will be
powered by batteries, making computationally intense
exponentiations, such as public key cryptography,
infeasible. An alternative solution is to implement
symmetric key cryptography to secure communica-
tions. Symmetric key cryptography requires all group
members to use the same shared key. This shared
decryption key is often called the Session Encryption
Key (SEK) or Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). To
preserve the secrecy (both forward and backward) of
the multicast data, the SEK needs to be updated upon
certain events such as a member joining and leaving
the group.
Group key management is one of the most
resource-intensive operations on the network, and
the dynamic nature of MANETs increases the com-
plexity and overhead of managing this process. This is
even more of a challenge when the number of mem-
bers in the multicast group is large. Increasing the
number of members not only increases the amount of
keys that need to be distributed, but it also increases
the frequency of rekeying because there will undoubt-
edly be more activity. This security overhead can
overwhelm the network if a proper security architec-
ture is not in place. Thus, the scalability of the
selected security architecture is crucial when the
size of the group grows.
3. Secure and Scalable Group
Communication Architectures
The Hubenko architecture is a secure group commu-
nication architecture that combines the key features of
the well-known multicast architectures in a way that
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increases system scalability for secure multicast in a
low earth orbit (LEO) satellite environment [11].
Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of the Hubenko
architecture in a LEO satellite environment. The LEO
satellites are represented by satellite figures, group
keys are represented by letters, and users are repre-
sented by numbers. In this architecture, LEO satellites
form a cluster at the top of the hierarchy with a
group key ‘‘V’’. Group Cluster Keys A through H are
assigned to a cluster of users. A different group key
for each cluster. The satellite application in [11] is
essentially a two-tier architecture. Since the group
cluster keys are maintained anboard the satellite. The
Hubenko architecture is modular in its design. As a
result, the underlying multicast routing and rekeying
protocol are transparent and can be selected to best fit
each unique application.
One of the key features incorporated into the
Hubenko architecture is clustering. Clustering divides
a single large multicast group into subgroups to
reduce the overhead involved when group members
join or leave the group. The best features of two
clustering architectures, known as Spatial Clustering
[12] and Iolus [13] are combined to form the basic
framework of the Hubenko architecture. Multicast
groups are divided into subgroups (clusters) based
on the physical location of its members. By using
spatial boundaries the key distribution scheme can
exploit the parallelism inherent in different parts of a
multicast tree to greatly enhance performance [12].
Using the Iolus framework, all of the clusters are
independent and each cluster has its own group leader
and secret group key. As a result, if a new member
joins or leaves the multicast group, only the affected
cluster needs to rekey as opposed to the entire multi-
cast group. Each cluster is managed by a group
security agent (GSA), known as a cluster leader. The
cluster leaders work with other cluster leaders to
bridge the local multicast traffic from each cluster
into all of the other clusters as needed [13]. At the
head of the hierarchy is a group security controller
that manages all of the cluster leaders and the overall
security of the group. This is the job of the satellites in
the Hubenko architecture. The number and size of the
clusters as well as the number of levels in the
hierarchy is flexible depending on the application.
To further increase system scalability, the Hubenko
architecture incorporates many of the crucial features of
another security architecture known as Gothic [10].
Gothic is a comprehensive architecture that provides
GAC. The architecture contains a group policy manage-
ment system and a group member authorization system.
The group policy management system has a group
owner who provides a list of authorized members and
other appropriate security policies for the group to the
access control server (ACS). The groupmember author-
ization system provides the core control of the archi-
tecture by controlling access to the group [10]. These
features strengthen system security by preventing un-
authorized users from attempting malicious acts such as
traffic analysis or denial of service attacks. The de-
signers of Gothic created the architecture with low
computation overhead at the routers, low message
overhead, and low support infrastructure requirements
[10]. These attributes are ideal for resource-constrained
MANETs and, in particular, UAV swarms.
Another important feature of Gothic used in the
Hubenko architecture is the group access control aware
Fig. 1. Hubenko architecture.
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group key management (GACA-GKM) [10]. This
feature leverages the trust built into the GAC system
to reduce the requirements of group key management
and obtain substantial overhead reductions in a way
that enhances scalability and improves performance in
terms of less rekeying overhead [11]. For example, in a
typical group key management system, whenever a
user joins or leaves a multicast group, the entire system
is rekeyed based on the assumption that the new user
could have gained access to either the old encrypted
data prior to arrival or to new encrypted data after
departure. By leveraging the services of the GAC
system to ensure no unwanted users have access to
the data prior to their validated join or after their
departure, a rekey is not required [11].
4. Approach
Although the Hubenko architecture has been designed
for a LEO satellite system, this research investigates
the feasibility of using the architecture to provide a
secure, scalable multicast architecture for UAV
swarms in the global information grid (GIG). The
Hubenko architecture applied to a UAV swarm is
shown in Figure 2. A large UAV such as a Global
Hawk has a similar role as the LEO satellite in the
original Hubenko architecture; however, this research
studies the impact of using the Hubenko architecture
in a three-tier hierarchal network with the three layers
being a Global Hawk, cluster leaders, and users
(UAVs). The Global Hawk is the group security
controller, group ACS, and is responsible for the
overall security of the entire swarm. ‘‘GK’’ is the
multicast group key shared among the cluster leaders
and the Global Hawk. Each cluster has its own cluster
key represented by ‘‘CKn’’. The black lines represent
communication links while the circles with thick lines
represent cluster boundaries. The dashed lines repre-
sent the GACA-GKM on the Global Hawk, which
communicates with the cluster leaders to manage
access to the group. Instead of satellite spot beams
dictating the number and size of the clusters, this is
constrained by the capabilities of the UAVs selected as
cluster leaders. When a multicast group first forms,
the Global Hawk assigns UAVs as either cluster
leaders or cluster members based on their capabilities
and location. Ideally medium-sized UAVs are as-
signed as cluster leaders since they have greater range,
endurance, and processing capabilities. The cluster
leaders communicate with the Global Hawk flying at
an altitude of about 15 km and all of the UAVs in their
respective clusters. To increase available bandwidth
and avoid transmission collisions the cluster leaders
loiter above their clusters and use directional antennas
aimed at their cluster. The cluster leaders communi-
cate amongst each other to keep their clusters from
overlapping.
The other architectures evaluated in this study are
the baseline and the cluster. The baseline architecture
for a swarm of UAVs is a flat model, consisting of
the swarm and the multicast group leader, which is the
Global Hawk. It includes the basic security functions of
key generation, key storage, key agreement, and group
key distribution to provide a dynamic application
proof-of-concept [11]. The entire swarm shares a single
SEK and thus every swarm member is rekeyed on a
member join or departure. The cluster architecture is an
enhanced baseline architecture that includes the clus-
tering concepts from Spatial Clustering and Iolus. Each
cluster is independent and has its own unique SEK. As
a result, each cluster only needs to be rekeyed when
there is a join to, or departure from its cluster.
5. System Description
The System Under Test (SUT) is the UAV Swarm
Group Communication System. It consists of the
security architecture, wireless network, UAVs, and
the multicast routing protocol. The component under
test (CUT) is the security architecture. Specifically,
the Hubenko architecture is compared to a baseline
flat architecture and a basic clustered architecture.
The workload of the SUT is ultimately the amount
of multicast traffic that needs to be distributed. This
study specifically focuses on reducing the traffic and
overhead associated with group key management and
distribution. Thus, the amount of multicast traffic
related to group key management depends upon
several parameters including the size of the swarmFig. 2. Hubenko architecture applied to UAV swarm.
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(multicast group), the number and rate of joins
and departures to the multicast group, the swarm’s
mobility, the number of clusters, and the length of the
group key. The workload to the SUT is generated by
varying these parameters. For example, increasing the
swarm size, the group join rate, the group departure
rate, the swarm’s mobility, and the length of the key
will all increase the amount of rekey operations
necessary to secure the swarm. As a result the overall
amount of multicast traffic increases, thus increasing
the workload to the SUT. On the other hand, decreas-
ing the swarm size, the group join rate, the group
departure rate, the swarm’s mobility, and the length of
the key will decrease the amount of rekey operations
necessary, thus reducing multicast traffic and the
workload to the SUT. The system parameters consist
of the transmission range, bandwidth, the physical
layer and MAC standard, battery power, processing
capabilities, cluster diameter, and UAV speed.
6. Experimental Design
The work by Hubenko in [11] provides insight into the
impact of the multicast group size and mobility on
each of the investigated architectures. However, the
activity and characteristics of the multicast groups
modeled in that work do not reflect a realistic scenario
for a swarm of UAVs. Hubenko’s study models a
multicast group whose members join within a fixed
time, with some of the members leaving after random
intervals. This is visually represented by Scenario 1 in
Figure 3. There may be some applications when this
model will properly characterize a UAV swarm, but
the multicast activity represented by Scenario 2 in
Figure 3 is a better model of a UAV swarm’s activity.
Scenario 2 represents a multicast group with contin-
uous departures, and rejoins to the group. Most of the
envisioned missions of UAV swarms (continuous
border patrol, battlespace surveillance, ISR etc.) re-
quire the swarm sustains itself for prolonged periods
of time. This could be several hours or even several
days. Currently small UAVs (SUAVs), which com-
prise the bulk of the swarm, have limited battery life
typically ranging from 1 to 3 h [14]. Therefore, in
order for the swarm to sustain its strength and size, its
members will need to depart and rejoin several times
throughout the duration of the mission to replace or
recharge batteries.
Thus, this study tests the Hubenko architecture
using Scenario 2 in addition to Scenario 1, to represent
different mission requirements placed on UAV
swarms. The scenarios are distinguished by the multi-
cast group activity over the simulation period. Sce-
nario 1 represents the scenario where UAVs join the
swarm and must depart after their batteries are de-
pleted. None of the departing UAVs rejoin the group.
In Scenario 2, the UAV swarm joins the multicast
group, but there are continuous departures and rejoins
over a longer period. The burden of continuous
departures and rejoins to the multicast group will
fully test the architectures for a UAV swarm.
6.1. Performance Metrics
As group key management is one of the most complex
and resource-intensive operations on the network, the
performance metrics should measure how efficient
and scalable the security architecture is in terms of
group key management. Thus, the following perfor-
mance metrics are defined:
 Total Keys: The total number of keys distributed
during the simulation period.
 Average Rekeys: Average number of times a UAV
must rekey during the simulation period.
Similar metrics were used to evaluate the performance
of the Hubenko architecture in the LEO satellite
environment as well as related work in the area of
secure group communications [11]. These metrics are
also relevant in determining potential security perfor-
mance improvements [15,16].
In addition to the metrics listed above, Scenario 2
also measures:
 Average Bandwidth: The average amount of band-
width used to rekey for a group rekey operation.
 Battery Consumed: The average percentage of
battery consumed by a UAV to rekey during the
simulation period.
These metrics are very important in an environment
such as an autonomous UAV swarm where batteryFig. 3. Multicast group activity for the tested scenarios.
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capacity and bandwidth are often limited and costly.
These metrics also further highlight the cost asso-
ciated with rekeying.
In order to calculate average bandwidth and battery
consumed, a few assumptions are made to simplify the
experiments. An encryption key length of 256 bits is
chosen, as it is a standard key length in the popular
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Thus, the size
of the network layer packet used to distribute the SEK
on a rekey is 688 bits as shown below:
Packet Size ¼ MAC Header þ CRC
þ Encryption Keyþ IP Header
¼ 240 bitsþ 32 bitsþ 256 bitsþ 160 bits
¼ 688 bits
The average bandwidth is calculated by summing all
the rekeys for each UAV performed over the simula-
tion period multiplied by the packet size and divided
by the number of seconds in the simulation. This
yields the average bits per second (bps). This calcula-
tion assumes that each UAV is rekeyed directly by its
cluster leader or by the Global Hawk in the case of the
baseline architecture. Also, this calculation only takes
the packet with the SEK into account. Management or
acknowledgement packets are not used in the calcula-
tion because they depend on the specific higher level
protocols used. This calculation also assumes a pair-
wise rekey between the cluster leader (Global Hawk)
and each UAV, which results in one separate message
for each UAV (n messages).
The same assumptions used to calculate average
bandwidth are also applied to calculate battery con-
sumed. In addition, assumptions about the battery and
radio are necessary. The representative battery chosen
for the simulations is the Thunder Power Lithium Poly
battery, which has a usable voltage range from 14.0 to
16.7 V and a 4,200mA-hr capacity [17]. This battery
is currently being used to power UAVs for swarming
applications [17]. The representative radio chosen for
the simulations is the Ubiquiti Networks Super-
Range9 radio, which is also currently being used in
conjunction with the selected battery in UAV research
[17]. The SuperRange9 is a 900MHz wireless radio,
which features up to 700mW of output power,
88 dBm receive sensitivity performance (for the
11Mbps data rate), and has proven non-line-of sight
distances over 20 km [18]. Transmit and receive are
1200mA and 500mA respectively [18]. The range
and capabilities of the selected radio and battery make
the assumed communication ranges for the three
architectures viable.
With the battery and radio selected, there is enough
information to calculate battery consumed. First, the
energy consumed to rekey is found, which consists of
the energy consumed to transmit the rekey packet and
the energy consumed to receive the rekey packet. The
equations used to calculate the energy consumed to
receive and transmit are shown in (1) and (2) respec-
tively [19]. The symbols used in the equations are
defined in Table I. The bits transmitted and received
are the number of bits in the rekey packet (688). The
current draw from transmitting and receiving are
taken from the radio’s datasheet, and the data rate is
assumed to be 11Mbps.
ERx ¼ bR  dR
3600 s
hr
 
r
¼ 688 500mA
3600 s
hr
 
11Mbps
¼ 0:0000087mAhr
ð1Þ
ETx ¼ bT  dT
3600 s
hr
 
r
¼ 688 1200mA
3600 s
hr
 
11Mbps
¼ 0:0000208mAhr
ð2Þ
The results of Equations (1) and (2) are divided by the
battery capacity to get a percentage of battery con-
sumed to receive a rekey packet and transmit a rekey
packet.
Battery Consumed Rx ¼ 0:0000087mAhr
4200mA
 100 ¼ 0:000000207%
Battery Consumed Tx ¼ 0:0000208mAhr
4200mA
 100 ¼ 0:000000495%
Table I. Energy consumption symbols.
ERx Energy consumed from receiving (mA-hr)
ETx Energy consumed from transmitting (mA-hr)
bT Bits transmitted
bR Bits received
dT Current draw from transmitting (mA-hr)
dR Current draw from receiving (mA-hr)
r Data rate (bits/second)
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These equations are used in the simulation to calculate
an overall average percentage of battery consumed by
a UAV to rekey during the simulation period.
6.2. Experimental Factors and Parameters
Tables II and III summarize the factors selected from
the system and workload parameters for Scenarios 1
and 2 respectively. These factors are varied to deter-
mine the impact they have on the security perfor-
mance of the UAV swarm in terms of the metrics
described above.
The following further describes the factors and
defines the levels chosen:
 Swarm Size: The number of UAVs in the swarm
impacts the total number of keys to be distributed
and also increases the overall activity of the swarm,
thereby increasing the number of times a UAV
needs to rekey. Based on proposed UAV swarms
and possible applications the levels selected for
Scenario 1 are 40, 100, 200, and 500 UAVs.
Scenario 2 also includes 1,000 UAVs to further
increase the workload.
 Swarm Mobility: This is the percentage of the
swarm that is highly mobile. In this study, UAVs
are defined as highly mobile if they travel outside of
a 5 km radius, whereas UAVs that stay within a
5 km radius are defined as loiterers. A highly
mobile environment requires much more rekeying
overhead than one in which UAVs loiter in the same
general area for long periods of time. The levels
selected for Scenario 1 are 25 and 75%. In addition
to these levels, Scenario 2 includes 50 and 90%
swarm mobility levels.
 Group Join Rate: This is the percentage of the
simulation time it takes for the entire swarm to
initially joined the multicast group. The rate at
which UAVs join the multicast group has an impact
on the overhead necessary to maintain overall
security of the swarm. The levels chosen are 15
and 30%. Thus, when the rate is set to 15%, there
will be several more joins to the multicast group in
a shorter amount of time compared to when the rate
is sent to 30%. The group join rate for Scenario 2 is
fixed.
 Group Departure Rate: This is the percentage of
the swarm that departs the multicast group prior to
the end of the simulation. The number of departures
from the multicast group impacts the overhead
necessary to maintain overall security of the swarm.
The levels chosen for Scenario1 are 25 and 75%.
The UAVs that depart the group do so after a
normally distributed amount of time. The group
departure rate for Scenario 2 is not a factor because
it is set to 100% for all of the simulations.
 Security Architecture: This is the CUT. The secur-
ity architecture impacts the total number of rekey-
ing operations and the overall security performance
of the system. The levels selected are the baseline
(flat architecture), cluster, and Hubenko.
The parameters of the system are the properties,
which when changed can impact the performance of
the system. The fixed experimental parameters are
displayed in Table IV and further described here:
 PHY/MAC Standard: The physical layer and media
access control standards define channel access and
data encoding, modulation, and transmission. IEEE
Table II. Factor levels for scenario 1.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Swarm size 40 100 200 500
Swarm mobility 25% 75%
Join rate 15% 30%
Departure rate 25% 75%
Architecture Baseline Cluster Hubenko
Table III. Factor levels for Scenario 2.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Swarm size 40 100 200 500 1,000
Swarm
mobility 25% 50% 75% 90%
Architecture Baseline Cluster Hubenko
Table IV. Fixed parameter values.
Parameter Scenario 1 value Scenario 2 value
PHY/MAC standard IEEE 802.11b IEEE 802.11b
Bandwidth 11Mbps 11Mbps
Processor speed 1.8GHz 1.8GHz
UAV speed 25m/s 25m/s
Battery capacity 4,200mA-hr 4,200mA-hr
Group key length 256 bits 256 bits
Number of clusters 10 10
Cluster diameter 10 km 10 km
Simulation length 7,200 time 43,200 time
steps (2 h) steps (12 h)
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802.11b is a widely known technology and the
current standard of choice for similar research [20].
 Bandwidth: The channel bandwidth restricts how
much data can be transmitted to the swarm per
second. IEEE 802.11b has a maximum bandwidth
of 11Mbps.
 Processing Capabilities: This affects the ability of
the UAVs to generate keys and perform encryption
and decryption operations. UAVs used in similar
research are currently equipped with a Kontron
1.8GHz processor with 1GB memory [17].
 UAV Speed:UAV speed impacts how fast and to what
degree the network topology changes. A reasonable
speed given the expected size and maneuverability of
a typical UAV in HARVEST is 25m/s [21].
 Battery Capacity: This affects the ability of the
UAVs to transmit and receive rekey packets. UAVs
used in similar research are currently equipped with
a Thunder Power Lithium Poly battery (TP4200-
4S2PB) with a 4,200mA-hr capacity [17].
 Group Key Length: This affects the security of the
system and the size of the rekey packets. Larger
keys increase the security of the system, but require
more bandwidth, processing power, and storage.
This study assumes a key length of 256 bits, which
is a standard length for AES encryption.
 Number of Clusters: This impacts the scalability,
efficiency, and communication overhead required
in the cluster and Hubenko architectures. The ideal
number of clusters varies depending on the situa-
tion and may be constrained by resources. Since
cluster analysis is beyond the scope of this research,
the number of clusters for this study is set at 10 to
allow for comparison to previous work [11].
 Cluster Diameter: This is a function of the antenna,
transmission range, and altitude of the UAV chosen as
the cluster leader and affects the swarm’s coverage
area. Based on the current capabilities of medium-
sized UAVs the cluster diameter is chosen to be 10km.
 Simulation Length: Longer simulations have more
activity such as joins and departures and more
mobility among the clusters. The simulation length
for Scenario 1 is 2 h which is near the end of the
endurance of smaller UAVs [14]. The simulation
length for Scenario 2 is 12 h. This represents UAVs
having the ability to swap out batteries and rejoin
the swarm after a certain amount of time.
6.3. Experimental Setup
The experimental setup for this study consists of two
sub-experiments, each with a full-factorial design
with the factors listed in Tables I and II. The first
sub-experiment simulates Scenario 1 and closely
resembles the experiments in [11], allowing for com-
parisons. It consists of 8 repetitions for each config-
uration, requiring a total of 768 simulation runs (4
2 2 2 3 8¼ 768). The second sub-experiment
simulates Scenario 2, which is a new test of the
Hubenko architecture. It consists of 20 repetitions for
each configuration, requiring a total of 1,200 runs
(5 4 3 20¼ 1,200). Thus, the overall experiment
will consist of 1,968 simulation runs. The number of
repetitions provides a narrow enough confidence inter-
val while minimizing the number of experiments ne-
cessary. Each of the repetitions for the same
configuration use a different seed for the random
number generator which affects the various aspects of
the simulation including the join time, departure time,
assigned cluster, and mobility of the each UAV.
7. Simulation Environment
Currently a swarm of autonomous unmanned vehicles
is still in the concept stage and an actual system is not
yet fielded. Thus, measurement of an actual system is
not feasible for this study. In addition, using an actual
system, if one existed, would be very costly and time
consuming. Using an analytical model is also not a
viable option because there is no such model that can
be adapted to this scenario. Thus, the best evaluation
technique for this study is a simulation. Because this
study is specifically concerned with reducing security
overhead in the form of group key management, much
of the details about data transmission, packets, and
routing can be abstracted away. This makes MATLAB
the best choice to perform the simulation for this
study.
A discrete event computer simulation using MA-
TLAB, (version R2007a) is developed to evaluate the
performance of the baseline, cluster, and Hubenko
architectures in terms of group key management and
distribution in a swarm of UAVs. The simulation
environment is a modified version of the one used in
[11], which models a satellite-based multicast net-
work. However, several modifications to the simula-
tion are made to characterize a swarm of UAVs and
this study’s experimental design. Although a detailed
description of the original simulation environment can
be found in [11], several significant modifications are
described below.
In the original simulation the time steps are left
undefined, however for the purpose of this research
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one time step represents one second. This means if a
UAV joins the multicast group at the beginning of the
one second interval, it will not receive a multicast key
until the end of the interval, thus having to wait up to
one second to start receiving multicast data. The same
logic applies to a UAV leaving the multicast group. If
a UAV leaves the multicast group at the beginning of
the one second interval, it still may be able to receive
multicast data for up to one second because the rest of
the UAVs in the multicast group will be rekeyed at the
end of the one second interval. In actual use applica-
tions larger or smaller intervals can be used depending
on the security needs of the system.
Another important modification is how the metrics
total keys and average rekeys are calculated for the
baseline study. Because the original study deals with a
geographically-widespread satellite environment, the
baseline architecture requires a rekey operation any-
time a user moved from one spot beam to another
regardless if the is was already a member of the
multicast group. However, in this study the baseline
architecture is a large UAV acting as the single multi-
cast group leader with a swarm of smaller UAVs
locally distributed out within its range. Because it is
assumed that the multicast group leader can directly
and/or indirectly transmit to all members of the
swarm, there is no need to rekey as swarm members
move within that range. For example, the highly
mobile UAV in Figure 2 would not cause a rekey in
the baseline study because clusters are non-existent
and Global Hawk acts as the multicast group leader
for the entire swarm.
The simulation environment is also modified to
simulate both scenarios. The original study only
simulates the multicast group activity of Scenario 1
shown in Figure 3. Aside from the changes mentioned
above both scenarios require changes to the experi-
mental parameters and factors to correspond to the
experimental design and properly model a UAV
swarm.
7.1. Scenario 1 Simulation
In Scenario 1,2 h or 7,200 discrete time steps of
rekeying activity in a UAV swarm is simulated.
During each simulation run, all factors (join rate,
departure rate, mobility rate, and swarm size) are
held constant, but the three architectures are tested
under the same conditions. Each UAV is randomly
assigned an initial join time to the multicast group, an
initial cluster, a mobility type (highly mobile or
loitering), and a departure time (if applicable). All
of the random assignments are based on a uniform
distribution. The join rate determines whether the
UAVs randomly join within the first 15 or 30% of
the simulation time. The departure rate determines the
percentage of the swarm that departs the group before
the end of the simulation (either 25 or 75%). The
mobility rate determines the percentage of the swarm
assigned as highly mobile or loiterers. The UAVs
assigned as highly mobile change clusters throughout
the simulation based on their velocity of 25m/s, while
the UAVs assigned as loiterers remain in their initial
assigned cluster. The total keys and average rekeys are
tracked for each individual UAV for each of the three
tested architectures.
7.2. Scenario 2 Simulation
In Scenario 2,12 h or 43,200 discrete time steps of
rekeying activity in a UAV swarm is simulated. This
scenario allows UAVs to rejoin the multicast group
after departing and models the situation where a UAV
swarm needs to be sustained for a long period of time,
longer than a UAV’s typical battery life. Thus UAVs
depart the swarm to recharge or exchange their
batteries and then rejoin the group. The join rate is
not a factor and is held constant. The departure rate is
also not a factor in this scenario because the swarm
members continuously depart and rejoin the multicast
group. Similar to Scenario 1, the mobility rate and
swarm size are held constant during each run and the
three architectures are tested simultaneously under the
same conditions.
In the beginning of the simulation, each UAV is
randomly assigned an initial join time during the first
simulated hour (3,600 time steps). Each UAV is also
randomly assigned a duration (battery life) ranging
from 30 to 180min. This represents the battery
capacities of the various small UAVs currently in
operation as can be found in the DoD’s Unmanned
Systems Roadmap [14]. Also, varying battery capa-
cities would be typical in a heterogeneous UAV
swarm. Each UAV is randomly assigned to an initial
cluster and as highly mobile or loitering. After a UAV
initially joins the multicast group, it stays for its
randomly-assigned duration and then departs. It then
rejoins the swarm 30min later representing the time to
swap out its battery. This is repeated throughout the
simulation. The total keys, average rekeys, average
bandwidth, and battery consumed are tracked for
each individual UAV for each of the three tested
architectures.
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8. Experimental Results
8.1. Scenario 1
The results from Scenario 1 are displayed in Figures 4
and 5. Both figures contain four plots labeled a–d,
representing the different configurations of the factors
swarm mobility and departure rate. The factor join
rate is not included because it does not significantly
impact the variation in either response. The 95%
confidence intervals are not shown on the plots be-
cause they are too narrow to be distinguished.
Figure 4 displays total keys versus swarm size. As
expected, more keys are distributed in the system
when the swarm size is the largest and mobility is
high. Also, as predicted, the fewest keys are distrib-
uted in the system with the Hubenko architecture. The
baseline and cluster architectures’ performance rela-
tive to each other vary depending on the swarm’s
mobility and departure rate. By visual inspection it
can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has statis-
tically significant differences compared to the base-
line and cluster architectures. Also, statistically
significant differences can be seen among the various
swarm sizes.
Using pair-wise comparisons of the mean responses
at the 0.05 level of significance, each level of the
swarm size as well as both levels of mobility have
significant statistical differences from all other levels.
The Hubenko architecture is statistically different
from the cluster and baseline architectures, but the
baseline and cluster architectures are not statistically
different from each other. The two levels of both the
departure rate and the join rate are not statistically
different. Using the mean response values across all
factors, the total keys distributed in the system is
86.2% less in the Hubenko architecture compared to
baseline and 89.2% less compared to the cluster
architecture.
Average rekeys versus swarm size is shown in
Figure 5. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, it can be seen
that the factors have similar effects on average rekeys
as they did on the total keys. Also, by visual inspection
it can be seen that the Hubenko architecture has
significant statistical differences compared to the
baseline and cluster architectures and has the lowest
average rekeys across all factor combinations. Using
95% confidence intervals, significant statistical differ-
ences exist among the various swarm sizes and the
two mobility levels. Using the mean response values
across all factor levels, the average rekeys per UAV is
84.9% less in the Hubenko architecture compared to
the baseline and 87.1% compared to the cluster
architecture.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from
Scenario 1. First and foremost, the growth rate of both
responses versus the swarm size and mobility is sig-
nificantly smaller using the Hubenko architecture. This
demonstrates the architecture is both scalable and
efficient as predicted. Also, we learn that the swarm
size and architecture cause the biggest variation in
Fig. 4. Total keys versus swarm size (Scenario 1); (a) 25% mobile, 25% departure rate (b) 25% mobile, 75% departure rate
(c) 75% mobile, 25% departure rate (d) 75% mobile, 75% departure rate.
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both responses followed by the swarm’s mobility.
Although the join rate has a small p-value using
analysis of variance (ANOVA), it causes less than 1%
of the variation in both responses. Therefore, join rate is
dropped as a factor in Scenario 2.
8.2. Scenario 2
The results from Scenario 2 are displayed in
Figures 6–9. Each figure contains four plots labeled
a–d, which correspond to different mobility levels: 25,
50, 75, and 90%. The 95% confidence intervals are not
shown on the plots because they are too narrow to be
distinguished.
Total keys versus swarm size is shown in Figure 6.
By visual inspection it can be seen that a larger the
swarm size and higher mobility increases the total
keys distributed, while using the Hubenko Architec-
ture decreases the total keys distributed. Unlike Sce-
nario 1, the cluster architecture outperforms the
Fig. 5. Average rekeys versus swarm size (Scenario 1); (a) 25% mobile, 25% departure rate (b) 25% mobile, 75% departure rate
(c) 75% mobile, 25% departure rate (d) 75% mobile, 75% departure rate.
Fig. 6. Total keys versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
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baseline architecture in every situation which reveals
the negative impact departures and rejoins have on the
baseline architecture. Using pair-wise comparisons of
the mean responses at the 0.05 level of significance,
each level of the swarm size has significant statistical
differences from all other levels. Each architecture is
also significantly different from all other architec-
tures. Using the mean response values across all
factors, 87.6% less keys are distributed in the Hu-
benko architecture compared to the baseline and
85.0% less keys are distributed compared to the
cluster architecture.
Figure 7 displays the average rekeys versus the
swarm size. Statistically significant differences can be
seen among the three architectures and the various
swarm sizes. Using pair-wise comparisons of the
mean responses at the 0.05 level of significance,
each level of the swarm size has significant statistical
differences from all other levels. Each architecture is
also statistically different from all other architectures.
The 25% mobility level and the 90% mobility level
are the only mobility levels with significant statistical
differences. A UAV in the Hubenko architecture
rekeys an average of 87.3% less than a UAV in the
baseline architecture. Similarly, a UAV in the Hu-
benko architecture rekeys an average of 79.9% less
than a UAV in the cluster architecture.
Figure 8 displays average bandwidth versus the
swarm size. In terms of reducing the use of limited
resources, such as bandwidth, the power of the
Hubenko architecture is evident. At the 25% mobility
level, both the cluster and Hubenko architecture scale
well, relative to the baseline, as the swarm size in-
creases. However, once mobility increases, the band-
width used by the cluster architecture nears that of the
baseline, while the Hubenko architecture is minimally
affected. At the 90% mobility level, the Hubenko
architecture uses an average of 85.3% less bandwidth
than the cluster architecture and 87.3% less than the
baseline architecture.
Figure 9 displays battery consumed versus the
swarm size. Interestingly, the baseline architecture
outperforms the cluster architecture in terms of the
response. In the baseline architecture, the Global
Hawk uses fuel, not batteries and rekeys all of the
swarm members. Thus, battery is only consumed
when a swarm member receives a new key. However,
in the cluster and Hubenko architectures, the keys are
distributed by cluster leaders, which are swarm mem-
bers themselves, and thus energy is consumed to both
transmit and receive a key. Although the results
appear insignificant as the percentage of battery con-
sumed is so small, the relative performance differ-
ences among the architectures are very significant.
Not included in the simulation are routing, lost pack-
ets, and higher-level protocols that add in reliability.
Thus, the simplest case is assumed to rekey the
swarm: one packet transmitted to, and received by
each swarm member containing the key. When rout-
ing and reliable protocols are factored into future
experiments, the percentage of battery consumed to
rekey will undoubtedly increase. Thus, the rate at
Fig. 7. Average rekeys versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
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which the percentage of battery consumed increases
with swarm size and mobility provides more useful
information. Figure 9 shows the growth rate of the
response versus swarm size and mobility is the lowest
in the Hubenko architecture.
8.3. Overall Analysis
Several conclusions can be drawn from the simulations
conducted. Most importantly, statistical analysis of the
data confirms the hypothesis. The Hubenko architec-
ture provides statistically significant performance gains
over commonly used baseline and cluster group com-
munication security architectures. By taking advantage
of spatial clustering to decrease the negative perfor-
mance impact of joins and departures, and integrating
GACA-GKM to decrease the negative performance
impact of highly mobile UAVs, the Hubenko architec-
ture outperforms the baseline and cluster architectures
in all of the conducted experiments. Using the data
Fig. 8. Average bandwidth versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
Fig. 9. Battery consumed versus swarm size (Scenario 2); (a) 25% mobile (b) 50% mobile (c) 75% mobile (d) 90% mobile.
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from both scenarios, the following summarizes the
performance gains achieved by the Hubenko architec-
ture compared to the baseline architecture (ranging
from the smallest to the highest gains across all con-
figurations):
 57.8–87.6% less total keys distributed
 59.6–87.9% less rekeys per UAV
 73.0–87.9% less bandwidth used to rekey
 16.9–58.8% less battery consumed to rekey
Similarly, the following summarizes the perfor-
mance gains achieved by the Hubenko architecture
compared to the cluster architecture (ranging from the
smallest to the highest gains across all configurations):
 55.2–94.9% less total keys distributed
 59.0–94.8% less rekeys per UAV
 55.2–85.4% less bandwidth used to rekey
 54.3–85.4% less battery consumed to rekey
Also important to realize these performance gains also
coincide with an overall improvement in the security
of the system via group access controls and indepen-
dent SEKs for each cluster.
Other conclusions that can be drawn from the
overall analysis of the simulations are the significance
and effects of the factors. First, comparing data from
the two scenarios, it can be seen that the longer
simulation time, and the ability of UAVs to continu-
ously depart and rejoin the swarm significantly in-
creases total keys and average rekeys. As expected,
the swarm size significantly contributes to the varia-
tion in all of the responses, causing the most variation
in all but one of the measured responses. The archi-
tecture is the second largest contributing factor in all
but one of the responses, where it is the largest. As
discussed previously, the join rate is significant ac-
cording to the p-value from the general linear model,
but it contributes very little to the variation in the
measured responses. The mobility of the swarm has
no effect on the baseline architecture, but has sig-
nificant effects in both the Hubenko and cluster
architectures.
9. Conclusion
The Hubenko architecture can be successfully applied
to a swarm of autonomous UAVs. Furthermore, the
Hubenko architecture significantly outperforms the
two other security architectures studied in terms of
reducing total keys, average rekeys, average band-
width, and battery consumed. By taking advantage of
spatial clustering to decrease the negative perfor-
mance impact of joins and departures, and integrating
GACA-GKM to decrease the negative performance
impact of highly-mobile UAVs, the Hubenko archi-
tecture is a very efficient and scalable architecture
ideally suited for a swarm of UAVs.
In most cases, statistical analysis of the metrics
finds swarm size to be the largest factor contributing
to the variation in the responses, followed by the
architecture, and the swarm’s mobility. The largest
performance gains are seen in large, highly mobile
swarms, in which UAVs continuously join and depart
the group. In this type of environment the Hubenko
architecture reduces total keys, average rekeys, and
average bandwidth up to 88% compared to the base-
line architecture. Battery consumed is reduced up to
59% compared to the baseline.
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